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FRAUD IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.
Our present number contains, in the case of Greene vs. Greene,
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a highly
interesting and instructive discussion on the doctrine of fraud as
entering into and impairing the decrees and judgments of courts.
Still the casual reader, who should not take into view the facts of
the case, in considering the language employed by the learned chief
justice. who delivered the opinion of the court, might be led into
errors to which the court itself would doubtless not go.
The case was this: a woman against whom a decree of divorce
from her husband was regularly pronounced, ascertained, as she
alleged, that he had obtained the decree by means of false testi-
mony. So, supposing also that she had on her side cause for divorce
against him, she filed her libel for divorce, and asked to have the
first decree vacated for fraud and collusion ! Of course there 'was
no collusion, which is a corrupt agreement between the parties
themselves; and the court very, properly understood her to mean,
what she did not say, that he had colluded with somebody else about
the false testimony.
Now in this proceeding, there were two mistakes ; first, in asking,
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as a part of her prayer in her divorce suit, to have the former
decree vacated; tat least the practice has been understood to he, that
the application should be made a supplc:nentary part of the first
suit, and not a part of another. lBut the second, and more fatal mis-
take was, in supposing, that she was entitled to go back of the time
when the alleged fraud commenced, affd have all the proceedings an-
terior to the hearing, proceedings which she admitted to be fair and
right, declared void, because of a fraud practiced at the hearing.
Hdre; evideitly, she, was entitled at the utmost to no more than to
have the wrong righted, by beginning at the point at which' the
wrong began, and so having merely a new hearing upon the libel.
Her application, should therefore, have been in some form in the
nature of petition for review, what form precisely, it is not material
here to inquire.
Nor need we inquire whether it is good law-English to call a
.Jidgineut duly reii.red on fail- testitnony, fraudulent. It is not
what is more commonly uidorstoo.l by a fraudulent sentence in a
,qe of divorce. And that third parties could take advantage of
tlie fraud, if it be caled slich, in a sentence of this sort, there is
little or no authority; and if the question were one of mere matri-
monial status, and not one of property rights resting on independent
ground, it would be contrary to those legal reasons which generally
govern cases of this kind, to allow them to do so. The general
doctrine is, that the matrimonial status must either exist or not, and
that the law knows no uncertain relation, vibrating between the
one and the other. How the court, as representing the public
interest, might ex bffllo treai such a- came on being made cognizant
of the faicts, Wiotid be. another question.
But ordinarily when we speak of a fraudulent judgment, in
divorce. law, we mean something which is not often seen ii other
departments of jurisprudence. Thus a htisband and wife wishto be
legally separated, and they put their skill together to cheat the
court.. ie makes,. what he calls, a libel for divorce, and she either
appears or does not, as may be'thought best adapted to accomplish
the object, and the judge is next imposed upon by false testimony:
thi is a cise of what is called collusion. It was the Duchess of
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Kingston's case. There is nothing sound, in beginning, 'middle or
end. There is really no case in court; and whenever the judge is
made cognizant of the fact, he will dismiss the semblance of a cause,-
certainly he will, if informed of the matter before final judgment;
and probably if informed of it at any time thereafter; and if there
is, on the rocord books of the court, that which might deceive by
looking like a record, he will have it cancelled. But the court
would not hear the parties themselves setting up the fraud, not be-
cause the judgment was of any real force, but because it would be
too unseemly a spectacle for a man to carry to a tribunal of jus-
tice his own dirt.
Another instance, of what is sometimes treated as iraud, occurs
when a man applies for a divorce to the courts of a state in which
neither he nor his wife has any domicile; representing-otherwise he
would not be heard-that he resides within the state. Here the tri-
bunal is imposed upon, and any decree it may render is a nullity.
A third illustration might be mentioned. In most of the states,
the libellant must give personal notice of the suit, if the respondent
lives within the state; but, if out of the state, there is a notice by
publication; and the libel must truly aver the fact of residence.
Now suppose a husband, while actually living with his wife, were
to proceed against her for divorce on the ground of desertion;
were to have a publication of his libel, which she might not see; and
by false testimony get the court to make up a decree. Here would
be a case of fraud. And in each of the three supposed cases the
court would not, in fact, have passed upon anything. ' There would
be both a quasi want of jurisdiction, and a quasi refusal to take
jurisdiction.
In the last two supposed instances, the respondent was no party
to the fraud. Would any one contend, however, that being defend-
ant of record, the only thing for her, after becoming cognizant of
the cheat, would be to ask for a rehearing; and that if the time for
such a proceeding had elapsed, she, but nobody else, was bound by the
decree ? This may be so, but there is no authority for such a view.
The Massachusetts case, we repeat, must be looked at in the light
of its facts ; and it cannot, therefore, be deemed an authority for
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such a doctrine. On the other hand, it would be a bold proposifion
that she could, at any time whatever, apply for a review in these
circumstances; for how could there be any rehearing when there was
never in court any valid proceeding on which to base even the Brst
hearing ? If there is no foundation, there cannot be reared a super-
structure resting on a foundation. When a fraud is practiced merely
on a defendant, he may waive it; but how, in the cases supposed, is
he to waive a fraud on the law and on the court.
The truth is, there is no law which necessarily lies so much in
dicta as the matrimonial; nor any in which it is so unsafe to take
dicta. Our best American judges have generally very little acquaint-
ance with the subject; the bar for the most part know almost no-
thing about it; and as every lawyer expects to meet an antagonist as
ignorant as he is, he takes no pains to learn. In the case we are con-
sidering, the court was compelled to find its way through an intricate
and difficult subject with no adequate help from counsel, and if in a
labored opinion, conducting to a correct conlusion, all the distinctions
did not present themselves to the court, we should not be surprised.
If any reader should wish to follow up this topic more minutely,
he will find a general statement of the law we have discussed in this
article, as far as the decisions have gone, with the authorities, in Bi-
shop on Marriage and Divorce, §§ 297, 300-303, 314, 350, 694-
709, 717, et seq. The views advanced in this article are not all
such as have passed to actual adjudication ; and so far as they have
not, they are respectfully submitted for consideration when the
questions shall arise.
J. P. B.
